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Chapter 8  
The Darker Side of Rights in Global Intellectual History:  





This chapter argues that the history of the Franciscan Order can provide an alternative perspective on 
the darker side of rights which goes beyond the critiques already established by postcolonial studies. 
It uses the methodologies of global intellectual history to question the boundaries of the contextual 
analysis of concepts. Postcolonial critiques of the darker side of rights have focused upon the 
entanglement between rights and colonialism that developed from the sixteenth-century extra-
European conquests. By focusing on the disputes about the legal and theological permissibility of 
Franciscan poverty in the medieval period, we see that discourses of rights were already entangled 
with colonial processes prior to extra-European conquests. In trying to theorize an ideological 
position of poverty, Franciscans had an ambivalent role in this history as they contributed to the 
development of rights by criticizing increasingly legal understandings of rights and were critics of 
the way in which this restricted other ways that the poor could legitimately use to acquire the things 




This chapter responds to the questions raised by this volume by reflecting on the geopolitical 
landscape of margins. Much of postcolonial studies formerly subscribed to a Wallersteinian 
core-periphery structure, identifying marginality with subjugated extra-European colonies.1 
This geo-political imaginary has shaped global politics, especially that of “development”, 
whereby a wealthy West gives aid to an impoverished “developing world”, re-creating a world-
system of centers and peripheries by re-inscribing neo-colonial relations of dependency.2 
However, this geo-political imagining that poverty and other forms of marginality have been 
created outside Europe obfuscate the ideological foundations of poverty as a European project 
that becomes a global project through colonialism. While “poverty” is not a universal category 
but a complex construct, the history of poverty helps reshape the landscapes of both global 
history and postcolonial critique as it transcends the boundaries of periodization and facilitates 
a reflection on the relationship between Europe and the world, challenging the chronologies 
and geographies of the history of colonialism and the geometries of power. The margins dealt 
with in this paper are therefore temporal and spatial, integrating Europe and the Middle Ages 
more fully into the history of colonialism; disciplinary, questioning the boundaries between 
intellectual and cultural history, and global and postcolonial history; existential, since extreme 
poverty and subsistence rights exist at the boundary between life and death; and intellectual, 
since discussions of the existential questions of poverty impact upon the conceptual landscapes 
of rights.  
The aim of this chapter is to use the history of the Franciscan Order, a socio-political-
religious movement with global dimensions, to go beyond the established paradigm of the 
darker side of rights. Through their experimentation with poverty, Franciscans made a unique 
contribution to the history of rights and colonialism. Franciscan history offers an interesting 
perspective, not only because they played an important role in the history of late medieval 
Europe as well as the early history of extra-European colonialism, but also because they 
                                                 
1 This is at the foundation of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s call to “provincialize Europe”. Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: NJ: 2007). 
2 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vols. 1-3 (New York: 1979-1989). 
voluntarily aligned themselves with the poor and gave a face to marginality, albeit a Janus face. 
Through their struggle to experience and understand poverty they experienced both subjugation 
and power in the Middle Ages and their history offers a double perspective. Franciscans were 
early critics of the darker side of rights and they provide a window into historic ambivalences 
within the history of rights. 
 
Established Paradigm of the Darker Side of Rights 
 
There is an established paradigm of the darker side of rights which stems from the perspectives 
of postcolonial studies. Scholars have recognized that rights projects have imperial dimensions 
as the universalization of a Western concept. Brian Tierney asked “is the whole idea of human 
rights peculiarly a product of Western culture?”3 In Laws of the Postcolonial, Peter Fitzpatrick 
and Eve Darian-Smith claim that it is now a “standard criticism” that “‘universal’ human rights 
enshrine occidental values”,4 and similar critiques occur in existing global histories and 
discussions of globalization.5 The history of the development of rights as a global project 
emerged in the context of extra-European colonialism and the genealogy of rights is entangled 
with this colonialism. The discourse of natural rights was developed in the sixteenth-century 
by the so-called School of Salamanca for the purposes of legitimating Spanish colonialism, and 
this is recognized as a precursor to the doctrine of “modern” human rights.6 The debates of 
1550 between Spanish theologian Bartolomeo Las Casas (1484-1566) and Spanish humanist 
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1489-1573) are often taken as the showcase battle that initiated the 
                                                 
3 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625 
(Atlanta, GA: 1997), 2. 
4 P. Fitzpatrick and E. Darian-Smith, “Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction,” in Laws of the 
Postcolonial, eds. E. Darian-Smith and P. Fitzpatrick (Michigan: 2002), 8. See also Anthony Pagden, “Human 
Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” Political Theory 31:2 (2003): 171-199. 
5 For example, B.S. Turner and H. Haque Khondker, Globalization East and West (London: 2010), 163. 
6 For example, A. García y García, “The Spanish School of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Precursor 
of the Theory of Human Rights,” Ratio Juris 10:1 (1997): 25-35; and Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights.” 
long march to modern human rights. Lewis Hanke traced the contribution of Spanish theorists 
to the history of rights during the history of the Spanish Empire,7 and this was initially seen as 
a contribution to the myth of the Spanish Empire as a benevolent empire, the so-called White 
Legend.8 Others have seen the Spanish contribution to rights as another contribution to 
colonialism. For example, Daniel Castro described Las Casas, who famously produced a rights-
based defense of the Amerindians, as a “tactician of ecclesiastic imperialism”.9 The 
contribution of another Salamanca rights scholar, Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) has also 
been critiqued. Carlos Esteban Deive contended that “in reality, Vitoria’s opinion of the Indians 
scarcely differed from that of Sepúlveda”.10 Anthony Anghie famously exposed the problematic 
relationship between Vitoria’s contribution to international law and colonialism.11 Robert 
Williams argued that “Vitoria’s Law of Nations provided Western legal discourse with its first 
secularly oriented, systematized elaboration of the superior rights of civilized Europeans to 
invade and conquer normatively divergent peoples.”12 These critiques identify the 
entanglement between rights, understood as a basic protection of an individual and the 
limitation of subjugation and colonialism, understood as the exploitation of individuals and the 
extension of subjugation. Existing critiques of the darker side of rights tend to focus on the 
development of extra-European colonialism in the sixteenth century, and particularly the role 
that rights played in the legal processes which constructed the space of the Americas as colonial 
space.13  
                                                 
7 Lewis Hanke, All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé De Las Casas and Juan Ginés 
De Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (DeKalb, Ill.: 1994). 
8 B. Keen, “The White Legend Revisited: A Reply to Professor Hanke’s ‘Modest Proposal,’” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 51:2 (1971): 336-335. 
9 D. Castro, Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé De Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism 
(Durham, NC: 2007), 13.  
10 “La opinión de Vitoria sobre los indios, en realidad, apenas difiere de la Sepúlveda,” Carlos Esteban Deive, La 
Española y la esclavitud de los Indios (Santo Domingo: 1995), 21. 
11 Anthony Angie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK: 2005).  
12 R.A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourse of the Conquest (Oxford: 1990), 
106, cited in G. Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community, 
and Political Justice since Vitoria (Aldershot, UK: 2002), 99. 
13 For example, S. Arias and R. Marrero-Fente (eds.), Coloniality, Religion, and the Law in the Early Iberian 
World (Nashville, TN: 2014), and Darian-Smith and Fitzpatrick, Laws of the Postcolonial. 
The global turn prompts us to adopt a broader perspective of “context”, and the 
intellectual history of medieval Europe reminds us that, historically, law was not the only 
context in which rights could be understood and that “rights” have had different articulations 
and meanings. If we integrate the history of Europe and the Middle Ages, we arrive at an 
alternative perspective on the darker side of rights by seeing the way in which ambivalence, the 
simultaneous accommodation of contradictory positions, was part of the internal dynamics of 
the concept of right.  
Franciscan history offers a way to approach this ambivalence. Their history is entangled 
both with the intellectual and political history of late medieval Europe and with the unfolding 
of extra-European colonialism in the Americas in the sixteenth century. The ambivalence of 
Franciscan history is generated by their complex ideology of poverty, which simultaneously 
revealed the sufferings of poverty while also valorizing poverty as a sacred category within the 
Christian tradition. Through their performance of voluntary poverty, they expressed solidarity 
with the poor of Europe and with the Amerindians in the sixteenth century, while also 
representing an elite group. They expressed solidarity with the poor, but they also celebrated 
poverty.   
 
Franciscan History: A Strategy for Accessing Historical Ambivalence 
 
The history of the Franciscan Order is a prism through which we can see the history of 
ambivalence. The Franciscans emerged in Italy in the early thirteenth century and voluntarily 
aligned themselves with the poor and marginalized within European society. Later, they played 
important roles in the history of European colonialism in the Americas in the sixteenth century. 
Franciscan history provides a way to transcend the boundaries of periodization and the 
geographies associated with the history of colonialism and reflect upon the histories of 
marginality which are produced globally. 
The Franciscans harnessed ambivalence. First, they were institutionally ambivalent; 
they had emerged as a radical counter-community but were absorbed into the hierarchy and 
bureaucracy of the Church. Their voluntary alignment with the poor and dispossessed had been 
controversial as it contained a radical criticism of society. The Order’s founder, Francis of 
Assisi (1182-1226), renounced his possessions to live from what he could receive from begging, 
like the poor. Through practicing voluntary poverty he challenged the voluntary nature of the 
redistribution system of charity, claiming that “alms are a legacy and a justice due to the poor 
that our Lord Jesus Christ acquired for us”.14 Through re-enacting the poverty of Christ and the 
Apostles, the Franciscans also posed a criticism to the wealth of the Church. However, despite 
occupying a radical position, they avoided charges of heresy and were assimilated into the 
Church.  
Second, their doctrine of absolute and evangelical poverty involved an inversion of 
familiar landscapes of power; they saw themselves as liberated and empowered by poverty, 
subjugation, and obedience. This paradox was explored in particular by the more radical 
Spiritual Franciscans that emerged in the fourteenth century. For example, Franciscan friar 
Angelo of Clareno (1247-1337) wrote, “he frees himself from earthly desires from the bottom 
up who wants to be free from the body, and wants by means and punishments and torture to 
cross over to Christ, who bore the suffering and the death of the cross for us”.15 Here we see 
the Franciscan idea that freedom is achieved through suffering. This pursuit and valorization of 
the complete overcoming of self, remained important to Franciscans in the sixteenth century as 
they spread across the Americas, the first missionaries amongst the Amerindians. The Oroz 
Codex (documents relating to the Franciscans in the Americas compiled in the late sixteenth 
                                                 
14 Francis of Assisi, “Fragments,” in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, vols. 1-2, eds. Regis J. Armstrong, 
Hellman J. A. Wayne and William J. Short (New York: 1999–2001), 90. 
15 Angelo Clareno, A Chronicle or History of the Seven Tribulations of the Order of Brothers Minor, trans. David 
Burr and E. Randolph Daniel (New York: 2005), 20.  
and early seventeenth centuries) reported how Martín de Valencia (1474-1534), the leader of 
the first Franciscans to arrive in Mexico after the conquest, had performed violence against 
himself in his Spanish hometown for the love of Jesus and “to conquer himself”.16 The 
Franciscans’ inversion of the familiar landscapes of power, their exploration of poverty as 
power and suffering as freedom, provide a way to view the ambivalence which is intrinsic to 
the darker side of rights.  
Third, the Franciscans are known for their contribution to the history of rights, but rather 
than seeing rights as a protection of freedom, the Franciscans wanted freedom from legal rights. 
Franciscan intellectuals had tried to engineer a radical doctrine of poverty in the Middle Ages 
which theorized a space of action which was free from the constraints of all kinds of property 
rights. The conceptual possibility was designed by Minister General of the Order, Bonaventure 
(1217-1274), with the term simplex usus (simple use of goods), which was differentiated from 
all kinds of property rights (dominium understood as equivalent with ius). Pope Nicholas III (as 
pope 1277-1280) issued the interpretation of the Franciscan rule in his bull Exiit qui seminat 
(1279) and codified (within the Bonaventurian lines) the Franciscan claim to be free from 
property rights,17 using the category of simplex usus facti to make a distinction from usus iuris. 
The arrangement was controversial and stockpiled problems for the Franciscan order. After 
Exiit, the Franciscans were opposed by the secular masters of the University of Paris, who 
refuted the idea that the Franciscans could be extra-legal persons; using things without rights 
threatened the juridical framework of society. In his Quodlibet XII, Godfrey of Fontaines 
(c.1250-1309) claimed that it was impossible for the Franciscans to renounce their right to use 
                                                 
16 Oroz Codex, ed. and trans. A. Chavez (Washington, DC: 1972), 180.  
17 Nicholas III, Exiit qui seminat, in Liber Sextus, Corpus iuris canonici, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig 1879; Graz 
1959, 2nd ed.) col. 1109-1121; translation from the Register of Nicholas III, 232–241, available at: 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/N3SEMIN.HTM (14.04.2011). See also David Flood, “Introduction, 
Franciscan Poverty,” in Nicolaus Minorita, Chronica: Documentation on Pope John XXII, Michael of Cesena and 
the Poverty of Christ with Summaries in English: A Source Book, eds. Gedeon Gál and David Flood (New York: 
1996), 34. 
temporal goods in extreme necessity because everyone has a right to use goods for sustenance.18 
Another secular master, Henry of Ghent (1217-1293), opposed the idea that the Franciscans 
could be free from property as they claimed, because everyone has a property right in their own 
person, which was both a right and a duty since one must obtain the basic necessities to sustain 
life, even by force if necessary.19 These thirteenth-century oppositions to the Franciscans’ 
position are often overlooked by rights historians, but, as Brian Tierney noted, the discussions 
on dominion of self and the rights of necessity set the ground work for those of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.20 
Despite the opposition of the secular masters in the late thirteenth century, there were 
Franciscans who wanted to expand rather than to contract the Franciscans’ ideology of poverty. 
Peter John Olivi (1248-1297) helped shape this more radical movement. He advocated not only 
use without ownership, but poor use (usus pauper), playing with the boundaries of what was 
necessary to sustain life.21 He was also sceptical about rights. Olivi interpreted rights 
pluralistically, not as an inherent good. As Jussi Varkemaa reminds us elsewhere, Olivi 
associated the notion of rights as a power, but also as a subjection or obligation (ius subiectionis 
vel obligationis), as well as the right of debt (ius debiti).22 As Varkemaa also observes, Olivi 
was interested in metaphysics and his main question was whether objects signified by words 
had any real existence.23 This questioned the relationship between “right” as concept and 
physical reality.  
The fascination with rights as a power from which the Franciscans wanted to be free in 
                                                 
18 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XII, q. 19, 142. Cited in Virpi Mäkinen, “Rights and Duties in Late 
Scholastic Discussion on Extreme Necessity,” in Transformations in Medieval and Early-Modern Rights 
Discourse, eds. Virpi Mäkinen and Petter Korkman (Dordrecht: 2006), 47.  
19 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 86. See also Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetal Questions on Moral Problems, 
trans. Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee, Wis.: 2005). 
20 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 89. See also Jussi Varkemaa, Summenhart’s Theory of Individual Rights 
(Leiden: 2012). 
21 Peter John Olivi, De usus pauper: The Questio and the Tractatus, ed. David Burr (Firenze: 1992). 
22 Varkemaa, Summenhart’s Theory, 21, citing “Question de P.J. Olivi “Quid ponat ius vel dominium ou encore 
De signis voluntariis,” ed. P. F. Delorme, Antonianum 20 (1945): 309-330.  
23 Ibidem. 
order to achieve their poverty was a later development of the Order’s history. Regis J. 
Armstrong reminds us that St. Francis never referred to dominium or ius, the concepts that came 
to dominate the poverty dispute and its contribution to the history of rights.24 During the 
fourteenth-century phase of the dispute, English Franciscan theologian William of Ockham 
(1285-1347) conceded that use in the case of extreme necessity was a natural right which was 
inalienable. The Franciscans’ desire to escape from the power and legal framework of rights in 
fact paved the way for the development of the history of individual natural rights. In order to 
realize a theological ideal of poverty, the Franciscans tried to negotiate a space for existing 
without legal rights, but they simultaneously contributed to the language and conceptual 
apparatus of rights discourse. They were questioning the inherent “goodness”, or even 
neutrality, of rights, and this offers insights into the longer history of the darker side of rights. 
Franciscan history, especially their interpretation of poverty as a way of licitly using the 
things of necessity without rights, signposts three possible insights into the darker side of rights. 
First, the manipulation and suppression of the Franciscans’ position regarding rights indicates 
that processes of marginalization and the colonization of concepts, languages, and memories 
were not only part of the history of extra-European colonization but also part of the history of 
Europe. Second, the Franciscans, whose ideas were also repressed in the Middle Ages, can be 
thought of as the first postcolonial critics of the darker side of rights. Third, ideas that were 
used during the discussion of Franciscan poverty, such as the idea that all things were common 
in the case of necessity, had ambivalent implications which reveal a darker side of rights.  
 
Franciscan History Reveals the Colonial Processes within Europe  
 
The Franciscans, who have been recognized for their contribution to colonialism as 
                                                 
24 R.J. Armstrong, St. Francis of Assisi: Writings for a Gospel Life (Slough: 1994), 153. 
missionaries in the Americas,25 themselves had their ideas suppressed in Europe in the Middle 
Ages. They experienced processes of control that are normatively associated with operations of 
power in extra-European colonial contexts. The history of the suppression of elements of the 
Franciscan Order and parts of their philosophy of poverty shows that power processes, 
including the control of language, ideas, and memory, were experienced in Europe before they 
became elements of European overseas colonialism.26 The critical phase of suppression came 
in the fourteenth century, after Pope John XXII (1316-1334) issued Quorundam exigit (1317). 
This condemned the teachings of the Spiritual Franciscans,27 four of whom were condemned 
by the Inquisition and burnt. In 1322 John XXII issued Quia nonnunquam which suspended the 
prohibitions of Nicholas III against debating and commenting on Exiit qui seminat under certain 
circumstances. This opened the debate on the terms of Exiit qui seminat, the document that had 
enabled the Franciscans to claim that they were free from both property and rights.28 Using the 
ideas of the Dominican scholar Herveaus Natalis (1260-1323), John XXII developed his attack 
on Franciscan ideas in his Ad conditorem canonum (1322),29 and Cum inter nonnullos (1323). 
By 1329 John had condemned the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, Michael of Cesena 
(c.1270-1342), his followers, and their theoretical defense of poverty.30 This papal opposition 
                                                 
25 See Julia McClure, The Franciscan Invention of the New World (Basingstoke: 2016). See also I. Clendinnen, 
Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570 (Cambridge, ??: 2003); R.H. Jackson and E. 
Castillo, Indians, Franciscans, and Spanish Colonization: The Impact of the Mission System on California Indians 
(Albuquerque: 2001). 
26 See Julia McClure, The Franciscan Invention. 
27 John XXII, Quorundam exigit, in Bullarium Franciscanum, ed. J. Sbaralea and C. Eubel (Rome: 1898), vol. 5, 
no. 89, 128-131. The Spiritual Franciscans were a more radical Franciscan sect, adhering to an extreme 
interpretation of poverty and harboring apocalyptic ideas. See David Burr, The Spiritual Franciscans: From 
Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis (University Park: 2001). 
28 John XXII, Quia nonnunquam, in Corpus iuris canonici, ed. Aemilius Friedberg, Editio lipsiensis secunda 
(Leipzig: 1879), vol. 2, Ex.Ioh.XXII, col. 1224. 
29 John XXII, Ad conditorem canonum, col. 1225, ff. There were two versions of this bull, see Jonathan Robinson, 
William of Ockham’s Early Theory of Property Rights in Context (Leiden: 2012), page(s) and Virpi Mäkinen, 
Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty (Leuven: 2002), 148-49. 
30 John XXII, Quia vir reprobus, in Bullarium Franciscanum, ed. J. Sbaralea and C. Eubel (Rome: 1898), vol. 5. 
The whole text of Quia vir reprobus is included in William of Ockham’s Opus nonaginta dierum, which has 
become the standard source for this bull. This argument was supported by q. 3, a. 1 of Natalis’ Liber de paupertate 
Christi et apostolorum. See Herveaus Natalis, The Poverty of Christ and the Apostles, trans. J.D. Jones (Toronto: 
1999).  
to the Franciscan position provides an insight into the power processes and manipulations of 
concepts developed in medieval Europe.  
The opposition to the Franciscan position went further than revoking their legal 
arrangement, but also manipulated meaning and memory and transformed the landscape of 
conceptual possibility within Europe. When the Spanish conquistadores arrived in the 
Americas, they set fire to codices, aiming to destroy traces of history and ideas that could 
challenge the orthodox beliefs of the Catholic Church. The idea of controlling texts, language, 
and collective memory was not a colonial strategy invented overseas but had been a normal 
practice of the battle for orthodoxy within Europe. The suppression of radical Franciscan 
interpretations of poverty, which had radical implications for property rights and social order, 
was part of this.  
For example, in his Cum inter nonnullos, John XXII ruled that it was heretical to claim 
that Christ and the Apostles had owned nothing.31 Not content at stopping at the history of 
Christ and the Apostles, John went on to transform the landscape of the history of property, 
starting with the paradise of the Garden of Eden. Melanie Brunner has argued that Pope John 
XXII’s discussion of the origin of private property is evidence that the pope had “been forced 
onto the Franciscans’ own ground”, since, as Brunner reminds us, it was Bonagratia of Bergamo 
(1265-1340), procurator of the Order, who had first referred to the book of Genesis in his 
defense of the Franciscan poverty ideal.32 Since Exiit qui seminat had been enshrined in canon 
law in the 1290s, the Franciscan position that there was no dominion in the state of innocence 
had become dominant, but this issue had long been debated. In his several bulls, John XXII 
used linguistic analysis, and uncontroversial concepts from Roman law, to argue that Adam had 
                                                 
31 John XXII, Cum inter nonnullos, in Corpus iuris canonici, ed. Aemilius Friedberg, Editio lipsiensis secunda 
(Leipzig: 1879), vol. 2, Ex. Ioh. XXII, col. 1229–1230; translation available at http://www.franciscan-
archive.org/index2.html (15.04.2011). 
32 Melanie Brunner, “Pope John XXII and the Michaelists”, Church History & Religious Culture 94:2 (2014): 
209. 
dominion in the state of innocence; he used language to manipulate the collective religious 
memory and his teachings on the state of innocence and first acquisition differed greatly from 
the traditional theological doctrine of the origin of property common to the collective memory 
of Christianity. It was significant for the Americas that the state of innocence had been 
reimagined during the Franciscan poverty dispute as the place where property developed, since 
the New World was paradise, and thus associated with the state of innocence, which was now 
a place where property could develop through First Acquisition.33 Following John XXII’s 
ruling, there should be no qualms about establishing a private property regime, since by 
predating private property to before the Fall implied that private property was of divine origin.34 
Gordon Leff described John XXII’s ruling that there was property in the state of innocence as 
the “sanctification of property rights”.35 
The papacy did not only target memory but also linguistic meaning; according to 
William of Ockham, John XXII argued that the Franciscans “by means of the ambiguity of 
terms and names (…) labours to bring in errors, overthrow the truth, drag the sacred Scriptures 
into a false meaning”.36 The repression of the radical implications of the Franciscans’ poverty 
doctrine was a struggle not only to assert monopolies of law, but also of memory and meaning. 
Postcolonial scholars have recognized the role of the manipulation of memory and language in 
the history of colonialism, yet in the Franciscan poverty dispute we find evidence that such 
processes are part of the longer history of rights.  
The contribution of the Franciscans to the history of rights is often formulated in a 
                                                 
33 For example, see Christopher Columbus, “Narrative of the Third Voyage of Christopher Columbus to the Indies, 
in which He Discovered the Mainland, Dispatched to the Sovereigns from the Island of Hispaniola,” in The Four 
Voyages of Christopher Columbus, being his own log book, letters and dispatches with connecting narratives 
drawn from the Life of the Admiral by his son Hernando Colon and other contemporary historians, ed. and trans. 
J.M. Cohen (London: 1969), 218. 
34 For more on this discussion, see Brunner, “Pope John XXII and the Michaelists,” 210. 
35 Gordon Leff, “The Bible and Rights in the Franciscan Disputes over Poverty,” in The Bible in the Medieval 
World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley, eds. Katherine Walsh and Diana Wood (Oxford: 1985), 231. 
36 William of Ockham, A Translation of William of Ockham’s Work of Ninety Days, 2 vols., trans. John Kilcullen 
and John Scott (Lewiston, NY: 2000), 148.  
constructive way, the way in which Ockham contributed to the transition from objective to 
subjective understandings of rights, for example, and yet it is the suppression of alternative 
ideas engineered by the Franciscans that was most significant. The Franciscans had played a 
role in this themselves since the Michaelists had tried to suppress the more radical ideas of the 
Spiritualists.37 The Franciscans had wanted to be free from property and rights, and the denial 
of this possibility by Pope John XXII in the fourteenth century is at the heart of the Franciscan 
poverty dispute and the Franciscans contribution to the history of rights. As Brian Tierney’s 
work also shows, rather than the Franciscans achieving the possibility of being free from 
property rights, the discourse contributed to the way in which, instead, property is the 
“paradigmatic right” of modernity.38 The expansion of the territory of property rights partly 
comes through the successful suppression of the alternative freedom from property rights 
proposed by the Franciscans.  
As the Amerindians would find out in the sixteenth century, property rights might not 
eradicate poverty, but would instead create a veneer of legitimacy for the appropriations which 
created it. Paul III’s bull, Sublimis Deus (1537) claimed that “they [the Indians] should enjoy 
their liberty and the possession of their property”.39 This followed on from the Laws of Burgos, 
an important document in the history of the colonization of the New World, which justified the 
forced migration and labor of the Amerindians while also guaranteeing that “as soon as the 
Indians are brought to the estates they shall be given all the aforesaid as their own property”.40 
Like the Franciscans, the Amerindians could not be free from property, but they could not be 
saved by it either. Just as the Franciscans had argued in the fourteenth century, now two 
                                                 
37 The Michaelists is the name given to the followers of Michael of Cesena, Minister General of the Order 
between the years 1316–1327, especially those that fled with him from Avignon in 1327. These were Bonagratia 
of Bergamo, Heinrich of Thalheim, Francesco d’Ascoli, and William of Ockham. 
38 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 131. 
39 Pope Paul III, Sublimis Deus, 1537, reproduced in Lewis Hanke, All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation 
Between Bartolomé De Las Casas and Juan Ginés De Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious 
Capacity of the American Indians (DeKalb, Ill.: 1994), 21. 
40 Laws of Burgos of 1513–1513, Royal Ordinance for the Good Government and Treatment of the Indians, trans. 
and intr. Lesley Byrd Simpson (San Francisco: 1960), 15.  
centuries later property was not a source of liberty for the Amerindians but a form of 
incarceration in a prison of disadvantaging legal structures.  
 
The Franciscans: The First Postcolonial Critics of the Darker Side of Rights 
 
The Franciscans experienced the repression of their ideas in the late Middle Ages; they can also 
be thought of as the first postcolonial critics of the darker side of rights. As is clear from 
Ockham’s writings, they also saw rights as a servitude or oppressive power from which they 
wanted to be free.41 
The Franciscan contribution to the history of rights has been noted, and yet it is worth 
considering the uncomfortable irony that their contribution is essentially the result of the 
suppression of their attempt to be free from concepts which they saw as oppressive. As stated 
at the beginning, scholars who have explored the entanglement between rights and colonialism 
have usually focused on the expansion of European legal processes. Yet, in the Middle Ages, 
law had not been the only context of right. In fact, during the Franciscan poverty dispute 
Ockham had opposed John XXII’s over-use of legalistic reasoning with regard to right. Ockham 
defined the “right of heaven” (ius fori) as the “way persons living without positive legal 
institutions can licitly use material things for their preservation or comfort”.42 He was a 
vehement critic of the monopoly of the legal context and criticized the way in which John XXII, 
a trained canon lawyer, took a legalistic rather than a theological approach to the question of 
friars’ poverty.43 Ockham had argued that the Franciscans were free from all positive (law) 
rights and that they simply used things since the permission of the owner enabled licit use 
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without any rights.44 He maintained that there was a difference between things that were just 
and things that were licit. The Franciscans claimed to exist outside the law. Ockham wanted 
Franciscan poverty to incorporate a poverty of law, arguing that the Franciscans did not have 
rights because they did not have the power to litigate in court.45 
John XXII opposed this space outside of law and ruled that the Franciscans had to be 
owners of the things that they consumed through use, and that they had to have a right for this 
to be licit.46 John’s legislation opposed the notion that there could be a realm of simple use or 
action between the just and the unjust.47 Herveaus Natalis’s (1260-1323) Liber de paupertate 
Christi et apostolorum influenced John XXII’s process of the juridification of the concept of 
right, which occurs through subtle linguistic manipulation, such as the conflation of the just and 
unjust with the licit and illicit.48 Ockham had fought to defend the possibility of a “pure exterior 
act, neither just nor unjust”, which could be attributed to irrationals such as animals, the mad, 
and children, and he claimed that this legitimate realm of action was accessible to Franciscans 
and in principle, to everyone.49 The friar was supposed to be considered dead to the world, and 
so without property. The denial of the Franciscan position meant that it was impossible to be 
outside the system of law. Through the discourse of the Franciscan poverty dispute the context 
of law became hegemonic, despite Ockham’s criticism of the growing monopoly of law on the 
concept of right. Postcolonial scholars have critiqued the colonial function of law, yet we find 
a similar critique in the work of Ockham in the early fourteenth century.  
As Homi Bhabha has argued, ambivalence is an important dimension of the postcolonial 
perspective,50 and ambivalence was certainly part of the Franciscans’ doctrine of poverty and 
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perspective on rights. In the fourteenth century, the main objective of Franciscan intellectuals 
was not to defend the rights of the dispossessed but to show that they, like the marginal groups 
of society, also had no rights. For example, Bonaventure and Ockham both compared the 
Franciscan position to that of slaves to explain how it was that they had use without 
ownership.51 The use of slavery as an explanatory device for the Franciscan condition harks 
back to the original Franciscan view that emancipation could be found in hardship and 
subjugation. The Franciscans transmitted their ambivalence to the Americas in the sixteenth 
century and projected their perspective onto the Amerindians, sympathizing with the suffering 
of the Amerindians while suggesting that the Amerindians shared the Franciscans’ valorization 
of the suffering of poverty. The sixteenth-century Franciscan chronicler and missionary Diego 
de Landa (1524-1579) projected the Franciscan sense of the freedom created through 
subservience onto the Amerindians; he wrote that the Indians became attached to the 
Franciscans, giving them information and taking their advice, because the Franciscans labored 
without self-interest, and their work resulted in greater freedom.52 De Landa projected this 
valorization of liberty in subjugation and labor at a time when the colonial labor demands on 
the Amerindians were increasing under encomienda and later repartimiento.53 The language of 
the sixteenth-century Franciscan chronicles of the New World give an indication of one of the 
ambivalent colonial legacy of the Franciscans. 
 
The Ambivalence of the Right of Necessity 
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The Franciscans not only played with the boundaries of freedom and power but also the 
existential boundaries governing human beings in the world. Their pursuit of radical poverty 
led them to their discussion of the rights of necessity.54 The rights of necessity, which became 
essential to the Franciscan position, had ambivalent implications and uses. As they tried to 
explain how poverty freed them from property and rights, they argued that use could be 
separated from ownership, and that all things were common in the case of necessity. During the 
fourteenth-century poverty dispute, the claim that the Franciscans had neither property nor 
rights was reiterated by the Minister General of the Order, Michael of Cesena (1270-1342), 
who (similar to Bonaventure) delineated a “fourfold community of goods”: from divine right, 
from civil right, from ecclesiastical right, where goods are held collegially, and from the 
necessity of nature.55 Ockham contributed to the defense of the Franciscan position and the idea 
that all things were common in the case of necessity, arguing that “necessity has no law”.56 The 
lawlessness of necessity was double edged; it could be used, as it was by the Dominican thinker 
Domingo de Soto in the sixteenth century, to defend the rights of the poor to the necessities of 
life,57 or it could be used to justify colonial appropriation. 
In one sixteenth-century travelogue of a Franciscan missionary, we find an example of 
how the Franciscans could use the arguments about use without ownership in the case of 
necessity to justify their colonial acts in the New World. The Franciscan theologian Juan Focher 
used the Order’s poverty doctrine to justify the colonial appropriation of indigenous property 
in the Americas. Focher explained: “in the case of extreme necessity, it is said, when the things 
of necessity can be acquired in no other way, all things are common (…) in this case there is 
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no sin in taking from the goods of the pagans the things that are necessary for life”.58 He added 
that “those who sustain the friars must also provide for those who, by mandate of the prince, 
accompany or protect the evangelic messengers”.59 Focher used the idea developed by the 
Franciscans during the poverty disputes, that in the case of necessity all things were common, 
to justify the appropriation of indigenous goods by the Franciscans and their conquistador 
companions. The idea that all things were common in the case of necessity had other 
implications, especially during the development of European colonies overseas in the sixteenth 
century.   
The importance of ambivalence to the darker side of rights is indicated by the “right to 
hospitality”,60 which was developed by Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century to justify 
the dimensions of Spanish overseas colonialism. Georg Cavallar summarizes that Vitoria’s 
right of hospitality encompassed the right to travel (ius peregrinandi), the right to dwell in the 
countries or territories visited, the right to trade, the freedom to use common property, the ius 
solis, or freedom of residence, nationalization and citizenship, and the negation of a right of 
expulsion without just cause.61 These rights could be used to justify European colonial actions 
in the Americas, such as the appropriation of raw materials like gold, pearls, and fish.62 It is 
interesting that while such rights (to travel, to reside in foreign places, to common property) 
were being used to justify European colonialism overseas at the expense of the Amerindians, 
such rights were also being denied to the poor of Europe through the sixteenth-century 
proliferation of poor laws, which repressed and discriminated against the poor.63 For example, 
using ideas developed by the Ypres scheme, Forma subventionis pauperum (1531) and Juan 
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Luis Vives (1493-1540), Charles V (as Holy Roman Empire 1519-1556 and the King of Spain 
1516-1556) issued a decree forbidding begging throughout the empire. The Spanish poor laws 
restricted the rights to begging, movement between cities, the rights of foreigners, and access 
to the things of necessity. Anyone found begging without a license was considered a vagabond 
and subject to four years galley service on the first offense, eight years on second, life on third.64 
Thus, the ships that took the conquistadores to America to extend their “right to hospitality”, 
were powered by the poor of Europe, who had had their rights to hospitality suppressed. This 
final example is a reminder not only of more examples of the darker side of rights, but of the 
ambivalences surging below the familiar landscapes of global history, which are revealed by 
the history of poverty. Yet, the experiences of the darker side of rights have not been equally 
disbursed globally.  
The Spanish Empire that unfolded in the sixteenth century was a deeply litigious world, 
and disputes about the rights of the poor played a role in the Spanish imperial project. These 
disputes are recorded in the pleitos de pobres, court cases involving poverty pleas. These pleitos 
do not represent dispossessed Amerindians, but rather European settlers who sought to avoid 
various license fees by appealing to the Casa de Contratación. The Casa de Contratación even 
met the costs of the pleitos de pobres.65 Among these pleitos are claims for remittances from 
the license fees required to have black slaves in the Americas, because these owners of black 
slaves were apparently too poor to pay.66 This reminds us that poverty could be used to claim 
rights, but whose rights were they protecting, and against whose freedoms and resources? 
The discourse of rights developed in relation to the condition of those at the margins, 
the poor and those dispossessed by colonialism, and yet this discourse has not always offered 
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protection against exploitation. Rather, as the Franciscans predicted and indeed (perhaps 
unintentionally) contributed to, rights, such as the rights of the poor to the basics of necessity 
through charity, may have resulted in an entrapment in a legalistic and ideological entanglement 
which regularized the structure of power asymmetries. For example, contemporary 
commentators have observed how international development has failed to eradicate poverty, 
since it is based on a paternalist idea about charity which developed in the history of the West 
which is structurally, and one might add ideologically, incapable of overcoming inequality.67 
In his work reassessing international humanitarianism, David Kennedy also observed that rights 
may be part of the problem inhibiting the development of global equality, but points to broader 
contextual issues in the deployment of rights,68 rather than the question raised by the 
intellectuals of the Franciscan Order about the nature of rights themselves.  
New research on inequality and the new politics of distribution currently being 
developed by the basic income movement is beginning to call the role of rights into question. 
For example, James Ferguson cites the case of a poor South African who is being “educated” 
about his right to a house: the South African responds by saying, “but I don’t want the right to 
a house”, then pauses and adds, “I want a house.”69 This raises the issue of the relationship 
between the discourse of rights and the politics of practices redistribution in a world of systemic 
inequality. This small final example reminds us that for those suffering from the lack of 
something such as a house, the right to something is not the thing itself. 70 In this way, a right 
to something might not overcome its absence, but rather serve as a strategy for avoiding real 
distributional justice. Such skepticism over the relationship between words such as “rights” and 
objects needed such as houses were, perhaps, anticipated by Olivi’s metaphysical interrogation 
of the relationship between words and things, and the Franciscans’ attempt to establish a system 
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In conclusion, the history of the Franciscan Order can provide an alternative perspective on the 
darker side of rights which goes beyond the critiques already established by postcolonial 
studies. It shows the need to transcend the period boundaries of modern and pre-modern, and 
to read the histories of Europe and the Extra-European colonialism together, to transcend 
postcolonial geographies. Understanding that the concept of right itself is the product of the 
suppression, the suppression of the alternative ideas developed by the Franciscans, goes some 
way to open further avenues of inquiry into historic ambivalences in the history of right and its 
entanglement with colonialism. It also demonstrates a different way to read the history of 
colonialism, showing that power processes were engineered within Europe before they were 
extended elsewhere. The experience of peripheralism or marginality is not confined to a space 
outside of Europe, but was instead an intrinsic part of European experience before it was 
exported elsewhere. 
The history of rights has been developed at the margins, either with regard to the rights 
of the colonized subjects of the New World, or the poor of Europe; what is clear from both 
these cases is that concepts of rights have not always been developed to help those at the 
margins, but rather to legitimate control of them or their resources. This historic ambivalence, 
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